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Non-technical summary
We present a model that integrates the discrete working time choice of heterogenous
households into a general equilibrium setting where wages are determined by sectoral
bargaining between firms and trade unions. The model integrates microeconometric work
based on microsimulation models and macroeconomic experiences with representative
agent models. Basically, it is an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model with 26 different
household types. Each of them represents a different socioeconomic group. Each person
chooses from a small number of working time options, among them non-participation.
The net income associated with each working time option is endogenously determined
and depends on flexible producer wages as well as taxes and transfers.
In the practical application of this model the exact formulation of the discrete work-
ing time choice turned out to be a crucial aspect for the model outcomes. There are two
principal alternatives: (1) in the Dutch MIMIC model (Graafland et al., 2001) household
heterogeneity (within household types) results from an autonomous working time pref-
erence parameter, and (2) a conventional logit setup includes a stochastic idiosyncratic
term in the formulation of household preferences for the individual working time options
(van Soest 1995). In this paper we perform a detailed comparison and assessment of these
two different approaches. We use both variants to analyse stylised policy reforms that
are designed to stimulate labour supply by a cut in the basic social assistance rate and
lower transfer withdrawal rates We report macroeconomic changes as well as effects on
the participation rate, average working hours and labour supply for different subsets of
households.
Against the background of a number of difficulties with the approach that uses an
autonomous working time preference parameter, the logit alternative is preferable. The
main advantage results from its direct compatibility with the underlying estimation and
simulation of labour supply reactions in a standard microsimulation model. The problems
of the logit setup — mainly the IIA implication — is less severe and can be approached
using established econometric techniques. All in all, we see the logit approach as the more
promising option in a general equilibrium framework combining comprehensiveness, detail
and consistency in applied research.
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Abstract
We compare two options of integrating discrete working time choice of heterogenous
households into a general equilibrium model. The first, known from the literature,
produces household heterogeneity through a working time preference parameter.
We contrast this with a model that directly incorporates a logit discrete-choice
approach into a AGE framework. On the grounds of both calibration consistency
and adequate accomodation of within-household interaction, we argue that the logit
approach is preferable.
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1 Introduction
Persistent unemployment at high levels remains at the top of the political agenda in many
European countries. While experience during the last decade has not been so uniform that
it would be justified to speak of the European unemployment problem (Nickell and van
Ours, 2000), unemployment rates are still significantly higher than the OECD average
(OECD 2004). The problems are particularly concentrated at the lower end of the skill
distribution where negative demand effects from skill-biased technological change and
shifting world trade patterns adversely interact with disincentives resulting from the tax
and transfer schemes. As demand conditions can only — if at all — be influenced indirectly,
policy reform proposals tend to focus on altering the negative incentives resulting from
the se-called “poverty trap”, i.e. the combination of a (too) small difference between the
welfare benefits when non-employed and net earnings at low wage levels, and a (too)
high transfer withdrawal rate. Economic commentators agree that reforms are necessary
here, but concrete policy proposals face two main difficulties. A reduction in the transfer
level would mean a lump-sum income loss for those who are actually not able to work.
This runs counter to the general redistributive goals of the tax and transfer schemes that
are characteristic of the “European system”. In addition, lower transfer withdrawal rates
usually lead to windfall profits for those workers who are in the respective income bracket
and do work already. These windfall profits and the ensuing tax revenue losses can be so
large that reforms of that sort are judged not to be financially feasible.
Therefore, any labour market reform that aims at increasing work incentives at the
lower end of the skill distribution needs to be carefully tailored both with respect to the
target groups to which it applies and the exact values of the tax and transfer rates. This
means that such reforms affect individuals on the labour market in different ways and to
a different extent. If we want to assess such reforms ex ante, we need economic models
that are capable of capturing the heterogeneous conditions on the labour market and
the specific behaviour of different worker groups. Microsimulation methods are normally
considered the adequate choice for such kind of analysis (Gupta and Kapur, 2000). How-
ever, if specifically tailored labour market reforms are actually successful in stimulating
the labour market, they have potentially large macroeconomic repercussions through the
adjustment of wages and the need to balance the public budget. The adequate instrument
for such economy wide interactions is applied general equilibrium (AGE) analysis (Shoven
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and Whalley, 1984).
We therefore advocate a model that integrates the general equilibrium approach and
microsimulation features like heterogeneous households and discrete labour supply options
(Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel, 2003, Boeters, Feil and Gürtzgen, 2004). In our model,
which is based on the AGE model PACE-L (Böhringer, Boeters, and Feil, 2005), we
have 26 different households representing different socioeconomic groups. The households
choose from a small number of working time options, among them non-participation. For
each of these options the net income is endogenously determined and depends on flexible
producer wages as well as taxes and transfers.
In the practical application of this model the exact formulation of the discrete work-
ing time choice turned out to be a crucial aspect for the model outcomes. There are two
principal alternatives: (1) in the Dutch MIMIC model (Graafland et al., 2001) household
heterogeneity (within household types) results from an autonomous working time pref-
erence parameter, and (2) a conventional logit setup includes a stochastic idiosyncratic
term in the formulation of household preferences for the individual working time options
(van Soest 1995). In this paper we perform a detailed comparison and assessment of these
two different approaches.
The focus of our comparison might seem relatively narrow if the model is seen from a
greater distance, but we think that it is justified given certain deficiencies of alternative
modelling strands. Therefore we here briefly put the model in the broader context of the
literature that is directed at a model-based assessment of tax and transfer reforms on the
labour market.
One type of models used in that context are AGE models with a single representative
household. Hutton and Ruocco (1999) is an important example for this approach. It is
possible to reach a considerable degree of heterogeneity in such a model (male vs. female
labour supply, part-time vs. full-time jobs, different skill categories), but there remains
a principal problem. The extensive and the intensive margin of labour supply cannot
properly be distinguished. There remains an ambiguity between a labour supply increase
that is due to higher working hours and one that is due to higher participation. This
proves detrimental to the clearness of the analysis both when it comes to the calculation
of actual transfer payments and when the model is to be calibrated with empirical labour
supply elasticities. (The same problems are encountered in Böhringer et al., 2005.)
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The distinction between the intensive and the extensive margin of labour supply is
explicitly accounted for in a family of models in which households are heterogeneous with
respect to the fixed costs of labour market participation and choose from a continuous set
of working time options (e.g. Saez 2002, Kleven and Kreiner 2003, Immervoll et al., 2004).
Such models are mainly used for the discussion of the marginal cost of public founds and
for the design of optimal redistribution systems. However, they generate results in which
the participation rate is flexible, but all active households (of a specific type) choose the
same working time. This makes it difficult to mimic the heterogeneity of actual hours-of-
work patterns except for a very deep disaggregation of households. In addition, the use of
these models causes problems if the hours-of-work options that are made more attactive
through a policy reform do not coincide with the average working time — as it is the case
with reforms encouraging part time work.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we describe in
detail the two alternative core labour supply modules of our model and their calibration to
the output of a microsimulation model. Section 4 then gives a brief overview of the general
equilibrium frame in which the labour supply modules are embedded. Section 5 reports
the results of the comparative scenario analysis. We simulate cuts in the social assistance
level and changes in the transfer withdrawal rate and describe to what extent the results
are sensitive to the assumptions about labour supply. In Section 6, we summarise and
draw conclusions. An appendix provides additional information about the aggregation
structure of the model and the German tax and transfer system.
2 Two approaches to discrete working time choice
At the core of our comparative study is the discrete-choice (DC) labour supply of hetero-
geneous households. In this section, we describe two alternative ways of modelling labour
supply, which both have a considerable amount of intuitive appeal and have been used
in applied economic work. However, as we later show in our simulations, they can lead
to considerably diverging results. The first variant described (Section 2.1) refers to the
to-date exclusive AGE model application of DC labour supply. This is an idea from the
Dutch MIMIC model (Graafland et al., 2001), in which household heterogeneity (within
household types) results from an autonomous working time preference parameter. The
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second variant (Section 2.2) is the logit setup, in which household preferences for the in-
dividual working time options include a stochastic idiosyncratic term. This is the standard
approach for the econometric analysis of discrete labour supply choice (van Soest 1995),
though until now it has not been combined with an AGE framework.
2.1 The autonomous working time preference approach
The DutchMIMICmodel (Graafland and deMooij, 1999, Bovenberg et al, 2000, Graafland
et al., 2001) was the first AGE model that included a discrete-choice labour supply mod-
ule. The central idea of the MIMIC modelling approach to discrete labour supply is that
a conventional CES utility function (with consumption and leisure as arguments) is com-
plemented by an additive part which captures heterogeneity in working hours preferences
and varies over households (even within one household type). The complete MIMIC model
contains a number of further details (disaggregation of leisure, black work, household pro-
duction) that make it difficult to highlight its distinctive features in labour supply mod-
elling and raise a number of additional calibration problems. Therefore in this paper we
draw on a modified version of the MIMIC labour supply module, which was used for policy
analysis in Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel (2003) and Boeters, Feil and Gürtzgen (2004).
We refer to this approach as “AWTP” (for “Autonomous Working Time Preference”).
The representative household of a basic AGE model is first broken down into a number
of household types, j, characterised by sociodemographic variables. Within each type,
households are heterogeneous with respect to the preference for working hours. We first
show the algebraic formulation of the heterogeneity-generating mechanism for the simpler
case of a single (as compared to couple) household. The utility function of a household of
type j and working-time preferences i is given in eq. (1).
Ui,j (hj,k) =
∙
αLj (T − hj,k)
σj−1
σj + (1− αLj )Cj (hj,k)
σj−1
σj
¸ σj
σj−1
− βj(
¯¯
hj,k − h¯j,i
¯¯
), (1)
Utility is defined over a discrete set of working time options h, indexed by k and varying
over household types. Working time enters utility in three ways: In the first part of the
utility function it reduces leisure (the difference to total time endowment, T ) and is
connected to consumption1, C, through the wage level and the rules of the tax and transfer
1We use a static approach and assume that consumption equals income.
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system. In the second part of the utility function it produces a difference to autonomously
desired working time, which linearly reduces utility. Heterogeneity within a household
type is generated through the parameter of desired working time, h¯j,i. Heterogeneity
between household types is captured in the parameters αLj (share parameter of leisure),
σj (elasticity of substitution within the CES part) and βj (weighting parameter for the
working-hours difference).
The approach for couples is analogous, but two-dimensional. The joint utility function
of couples depends on the hours combinations (hfj,k, h
m
j,l), where the individual spouses are
indexed by i and g and the superscripts f and m refer to women and men, respectively:
Ug,i,j(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l) =
"
αLj
³
Lj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l)
´σj−1
σj + (1− αLj )
³
Cj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l)
´σj−1
σj
# σj
σj−1
− βfj (
¯¯¯
hfj,k − h¯
f
j,i
¯¯¯
)− βmj (
¯¯
hmj,l − h¯mj,g
¯¯
).
Lj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l) denotes joint leisure of the couple and is defined as
Lj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l) =
³
αfj (T − h
f
j,k) + (1− α
f
j )(T − hmj,l)
´
, (2)
with αfj representing a weighting parameter for female leisure and Cj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l) denoting
average joint consumption. In the following, we explain the basic steps of the determina-
tion of the labour supply choice by the simpler case of singles according to (1).
For each individual there are several distinct labour market states, which result from
three dichotomies: (1) Each individual can be either voluntarily unemployed (supplying
zero hours of work) or participate in the labour market. This is part of the discrete
labour supply choice. (2) If the individuals supply positive hours of work, they are either
employed or involuntarily unemployed. The probability of unemployment is endogenously
determined in general equilibrium. (3) In the event of involuntary unemployment, the
individuals are either eligible for unemployment benefits or not. The probability of benefit
eligibility is derived from the benchmark data set and held fixed.
We calculate the expected value of consumption Cj(hj,k) as a weighted average over the
three labour market states (employed, unemployed with or without unemployment benefit
entitlement) with the respective probabilites. More detail concerning the calculation of
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the disposable income is provided in Appendix A.6. For given parameters of the utility
function (still to be calibrated, see Section 3), we can calculate the CES part of the
utility function for each hours of work option, UCESi,j (hj,k) , which is independent of the
idiosyncratic parameter h¯i,j. The values of UCESi,j (hj,k) for two adjacent working time
options determine the critical values of h¯j,i that delimit the individuals who prefer the
lower hours-of-work option from those who prefer the upper. We denote the critical value
of h¯j,i for household type j between hours of work category k and k+ 1 with h¯j,k,k+1 and
calculate it as
h¯j,k,k+1 =
hj,k + hj,k+1
2
+
UCESi,j (hj,k)− UCESi,j (hj,k+1)
2βj
.
If the CES utility for both hours-of-work options is the same, the critical value of h¯ lies
exactly half way between both. If one CES utility is higher than the other, the critical
value of h¯j is asymmetrical, and the extent of the asymmetry is determined by the value
of βj. The critical values of h¯j are crucial both for the calibration of the model (see
Section 3) and the policy simulations. A change in the tax and transfer system affects the
disposable income of the households. This bears on the CES utilities and thus the relative
attractiveness of the different working time options. The critical values of h¯j adjust, which,
depending on the distribution of the h¯j,i within the household types, finally determines
the frequencies of the different working time categories.
For couple households, working time is determined in an analogous manner. Each cou-
ple household chooses from a two-dimensional set of working-time options. We disassemble
the simultaneous maximisation problem of the household into two independent working
time choices of the partners by assuming that when one partner chooses their optimal
working time, they take the other partner’s income and leisure to be constant at their
conditional expected values given the benchmark probabilities.2 In this way, we obtain
independent critical values of h¯ for both partners.
The most important feature of the AWTP setup for the simulation outcomes is that
the critical values of h¯ only depend on the characteristics of the adjacent working-time
2The simultaneous maximisation of female and male working hours would encounter difficulties because
multiple local maxima are possible. (Given that the woman works longer, it is optimal for the man to work
less, and vice versa.) This would require an explicit comparison of absolute utility values, which doesn’t
match well with the overall mixed-complementarity set-up of the numerical model. Furthermore, it is
likely to result in discontinuous reactions of the households, when they switch from one local equilibrium
to another.
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options. If we make one working-time option more attractive through a modification of
the tax and transfer system, this will increase its “basin of attraction” (those values of h¯
that lead to the choice of this very option) at the cost of the options directly below and
above. Other options are not affected. Specifically, in the case of an isolated loss of income
for non-participation, individuals will only move into the lowest working-time option. The
consequences of this model setup in concrete scenarios will be highlighted in Section 5.
2.2 The logit approach
If one approaches the discrete choice of working time from an econometric angle, the
multinomial logit setup is the natural starting point. Among the econometric tools for
analysing discrete choice it is the simplest one and often used as a benchmark for more
advanced models (for an overview see Train, 2003). Adoptions of the logit model to an
AGE setting are rare, however. Among the few exceptions are the TREMOVE model (De
Ceuster et al, 2004), in which the logit approach is used for modelling the demand for
different car types, and WorldScan (Lejour et al., 1999), where it is used for modelling
international capital mobility. We know of no examples of a combination of logit discrete
choice and AGE modelling in a labour market context.
The simplest discrete choice setup is when the utility of each option is a combination
of a deterministic part, U¯ , that depends on a vector of the characteristics of the options,
xk, and an additive stochastic term. For household type j we then have
Uj(xk) = U¯j(xj,k) + εj,k.
The distinctive feature of the logit approach is that the error term, εk, is assumed to
be independently standard extreme-value distributed. Under this assumption there is an
explicit formula for the probability of preferring option k over all other options l from a
set m (McFadden, 1974):
P (Uj,k > Uj,l) =
exp(U¯j(xj,k))P
m
exp(U¯j(xj,m))
, ∀l 6= k
In a general equilibrium framework, where a large number of equations must be solved
simultaneously, such an explicit expression for the choice probabilities is of great advan-
tage. In other discrete choice approaches (probit or mixed logit) the choice probabilities
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can only be calculated by numerical integral evaluation. In principle it would be possi-
ble to combine this with general equilibrium equations, but in models that are highly
disaggregated this would go beyond what is computationally feasible.
In our case, xj,k is a vector of characteristics the hours-of-work options that includes
disposable income and weekly hours of leisure time for men and women,
xj,k = (log(Cj(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,l)), log(T − h
f
j,k), log(T − hmj,l)),
where the individual components are calculated in the same way as in the AWTP ap-
proach. We follow van Soest (1995) in assuming a quadratic utility function with A and
β as parameters that capture the quadratic and linear terms, respectively.
U¯j(xj,k) = x0j,kAjxj,k + β
0
jxj,k. (3)
The parameters A and β are estimated using the microsimulation model described in the
next section.
In contrast to the AWTP model, under the logit approach shifting is possible between
all working-time options. If we increase the attractiveness of one option in isolation, all
other options will be chosen less frequently, not only the adjacent ones. More specifically,
a characteristic feature of the basic logit approach is the independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives (IIA), which means that each of the other options loses probability exactly
in proportion to the benchmark frequencies. (This property is relaxed in approaches like
probit, mixed or nested logit.) In the simulations in Section 5, we will demonstrate the
consequences of this feature in practical policy analysis.
3 Calibration of the labour supply module
The point of departure for the calibration of both model variants presented in Section 2 is
a labour supply estimation based on the ZEWmicrosimulation model (Buslei and Steiner,
1999, Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus, 2003). We describe the estimation procedure briefly
in Section 3.1 and explain in Section 3.2 how we use it to generate the model parameters.
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3.1 Underlying econometric estimation of labour supply reac-
tions
The ZEW microsimulation model combines a calculator for the household income un-
der the current German tax and transfer system with a discrete choice labour supply
estimation that follows van Soest (1995). The coefficients of the utility function (3) are
estimated based on the 1999 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), using
the maximum likelihood criterion. We estimate the coefficients separately for couples, fe-
male singles and male singles. In each of these three estimations, it is assumed that both
linear and quadratic coefficients differ between individuals, i.e. all coefficients are broken
down into a constant as well as terms that interact with a number of individual and
household-related characteristics (age, dummy for citizenship, East Germany, handicaps
and children in certain age brackets). These interactions account for differences in the
preferences of households and individuals for certain hours-of-work options. Additional
constant terms capture fixed costs of working. For singles we include a constant for all
positive hours categories; for couples, there are two constants, one for positive working
hours of the woman, the other for both spouses working. Appendix A.3 reports details of
the estimation.
3.2 Generation of calibrated model parameters
While the labour supply estimation works at the level of individual households, both
labour supply modules of the AGE model use 26 aggregated representative household
types. These households differ by household composition and skill of the members, 10 of
which are single households and 16 couple households. More detail of the disaggregation
is provided in Table 7 in the appendix. Each individual (single or spouse) can choose
from a fixed number of discrete labour supply options. For married males, there are three
labour supply options. For all other individuals (married women, single females and males)
there are five options. The discrete options have been chosen so that they correspond to
the empirical distribution of labour supply behaviour of the different types of individuals
(Buslei and Steiner, 1999). For all individuals the first option is non-participation (zero
hours of work). The options are summarized in table 8 in the appendix.
Some of the parameters needed for the calibration of the AGE model can be taken
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directly from the GSOEP data set. These are: (1) the shares of the 26 household types in
the total population, (2) the distribution of household labour supply within each house-
hold type, and (3) the probabilities of receiving either unemployment benefits or social
assistance payments if unemployed.
For calibrating the labour supply responses in the AWTP version of the labour supply
module, we use partial3 own-price elasticities of labour supply. These partial elasticities
have been simulated for each household type with the parameters resulting from the
estimation at the individual data level (see Table 11 in the appendix).
The calibration procedure is set up to determine simultaneously two sets of parameters:
the parameters of the CES part of the utility function (αLj , σj and βj for singles, α
L
j , α
f
j , σj,
βfj and β
m
j for couples) and the parameters of the distribution of the autonomous working
time preference parameter, h¯, across individuals. We assume h¯ to be distributed over the
interval [0,70] in a stepwise uniform distribution. The steps of this distribution coincide
with the critical values of h¯, which delimit households that fall into different working-
hours categories. This means that all individuals working hk hours in the benchmark
situation are uniformly distributed between h¯k−1,k and h¯k,k+1. These steps in the density
distribution are then held fixed in the subsequent counterfactual analysis. The stepwise
uniform distribution is flexible enough to exactly reproduce the empirical working-hours
distribution in the model. In the case of couple households, the density distribution to be
adjusted is two-dimensional. It is composed of 15 cells, each with a uniform probability
density.
We calibrate the parameters of the CES utility part so as to optimally reproduce
the elasticities simulated with the microsimulation model. For given parameter values,
we determine analytically the elasticities that result in the model by calculating how a
rise in the wage in one working-time category affects the disposable household income
of households that supply labour in this category. Through the CES part of the utility
function, the change in consumption leads to an adjustment of the critical values of
h¯. Some households characterised by values of h¯ that are close to the critical values
in the benchmark will change labour supply categories. However, as the density of the
distribution of the h¯ is discontinuous at the critical value, the elasticity of the model will
be different whether we increase or lower the wage. We take the average of these two
3Percentage point changes of the probabilities in relation to per cent changes in the wage.
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reactions to match the empirical elasticities,
ηj,k = wk
dC
dwk
(1− αLj )
Ã
UCESj,hk
Cj,hk
! 1
σl fj,k−1 + 2fj,k + fj,k+1
2βj
, (4)
where fj,k is the density of h¯j between h¯j,k−1,k and h¯j,k,k+1, and ηj,k is the corresponding
empirical elasticity.
In equation (4) we have three free parameters for each single household (αLj , σj and βj)
and five for couple households (αLj , α
f
j , σj, β
f
j and β
m
j ). However, the effect of variations
in these parameters on the elasticities is very similar and nearly linear in the relevant
range. This means individual parameter values are not well identified when we solve
the numerical problem of optimally adjusting to the empirical elasticities. Therefore, we
arbitrarily fix the value of σj for all households at 2, which stabilises the determination
of the other parameter values. The values of the calibrated elasticities are only slightly
affected by this procedure. Table 11 in the appendix compares the elasticities that result
from our calibration procedure with the simulated elasticities from the microsimulation
model. The table makes clear that our model is fairly good in approximating the overall
level of labour supply reactions. However, with respect to the ranking of the elasticities
across the different working time categories, it is rather inflexible.
The calibration of the logit labour supply module is considerably more straightfor-
ward, because its basic structure is the same as in the estimation of the labour supply
parameters. The only difference is that we now work at the level of the 26 representative
household types instead of the individual level. For generating the parameter values of
the household types, we compute unweighted arithmetic means of all individual parame-
ters falling into the respective type. The resulting aggregated parameters can be found in
Table 12 in the appendix.
4 An AGE framework with decentralised wage bar-
gaining
The labour supply module is embedded into a computable general equilibrium model of
Germany (“PACE-L”). In this section, we only sketch the other parts of the model. Most
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focus is on the wage determination module of PACE-L, which, through the wage bar-
gaining mechanism, directly interacts with the labour supply decision of the households.
An extensive, algebraic model description and a summary of the data sources used for
calibration can be found in Böhringer et al (2005).
Labour Market
Wages are determined by sector-specific bargaining between an employers’ association
and a trade union. The bargaining outcome is represented as the maximisation of a Nash
function, which includes the objective functions of both parties and their respective fall-
back options. We adopt the “right to manage” approach: Parties bargain over wages, and
firms determine labour demand on the basis of the bargained wage. The union repre-
sents two types of workers, high skilled and low skilled. For each skill type, the union’s
objective function is calculated as employment times the value of a job minus the value
of unemployment. The values of the labour market states are recursively determined as
weighted averages of the incomes in the case of employment and unemployment, where
the weights are computed from the transition probabilities between the labour market
states (see Pissarides, 1990, for an overview of the search-and-matching approach).
We assume that the trade union is utilitarian with respect to the different household
types. The marginal tax rates and the values of the states of employment and unemploy-
ment are therefore calculated as weighted averages over all households and working-time
categories. In turn, the wage that results from bargaining in general equilibrium is used
to derive the income positions of all households in all possible labour market states. In
order to preserve continuity of the model, this dependence is linearly approximated. We
calculate an average and a marginal rate of the total tax and transfer effects for each
household and labour market state in the benchmark. These are treated as parameters in
the counterfactual policy simulations.
The two labour markets for low and high skilled labour are balanced by aggregating on
the demand side over sectors and on the supply side over household types. We assume that
with respect to household types the structure of labour demand is uniform across sectors.
The households captured by the microsimulation model include all households with flexible
time allocation and observable hours of work, which is about 60% of total labour sup-
ply. Pensioners, students, women on maternity leave, civil servants and the self-employed
are excluded in the microsimulation model. In the general equilibrium model, they are
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represented by an additional aggregate household with fixed labour supply. Household-
specific unemployment rates are aggregated into economy-wide unemployment per skill
group. Changes in aggregate unemployment are distributed among household types in
proportion to their benchmark unemployment.
In a wage-bargaining setting, the wages respond to reforms in the tax and transfer
system through two different channels. First, the reforms change the marginal burden
of the total tax and transfer system (either through an explicit change of tax rates or
through lower transfer withdrawal rates). This bears on the bargaining outcome through
the average skill-specific effective marginal tax rates. However, the effect of a specific
reform on the average marginal tax rate is normally not clear a priori, because in most
cases the marginal burden increases for some individuals while it decreases for others. With
a constant average tax rate, an increase in the effective marginal tax rate raises the degree
of tax progression, which leads to wage moderation on the part of the unions (Koskela
and Vilmunen 1996). Second, reforms of the transfer system reduce expected income when
being unemployed (and thus the fall-back position of unions) in two ways: directly through
lower transfer payments and — if they succeed in stimulating labour supply — indirectly
through a higher probability of unemployment (at given labour demand).
Firms
In each production sector, a representative firm produces a homogenous output. The
production function is of the nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) type, com-
bining intermediate inputs, capital and labour of the two skill types. Each individual firm
is assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector. All firms in one sector inter-
act through monopolistic competition. This means that firms can exploit market power
in their respective market segment. Cost minimisation yields demand functions for the
primary factors at the sectoral level and corresponding uncompensated (own and cross)
price elasticities for labour that are used in the Nash bargaining FOCs. Capital is mobile
across sectors, and the market for capital is perfectly competitive. In the simulations in
Section 5 we additionally assume that capital is internationally immobile, which reflects
a short- to medium-run model horizon.
Private households
We distinguish the 26 representative worker households, one dummy household with fixed
labour supply, and a capitalist household. The capitalist household receives all capital
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and profit income. Capitalists decide over consumption and investment according to the
approach of Ballard et al. (1985). Their utility function is calibrated to empirical saving
elasticities. Worker households, by contrast, do not save. The structure of consumption
is assumed to be identical across all households. Aggregate consumption is distributed
among the different consumption goods according to a CES function.
Government
The main focus in the model of this paper is on the complex tax and transfer system for
private households, which are calculated in a special programme module (see Appendix
A.6) and then linearly approximated through two sets of parameters: an average and a
marginal tax and transfer rate for each household type in each labour supply category and
each labour market state. Apart from the taxes and transfers for the private households,
the government collects the following taxes: a uniform capital input tax, a profit tax,
an output tax in production, and a differentiated consumption tax on all consumption
commodities. The government budget contains the revenue from all these taxes, the public
purchases of goods, and the balance of payments surplus or deficit.
Foreign Trade
Domestically produced goods are converted through a constant-elasticity-of-transformation
function into specific goods destined for the domestic market and the export market, re-
spectively. By the small-open-economy assumption, export and import prices in foreign
currency are not affected by the behaviour of the domestic economy. Analogously to the
export side, we adopt the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity for the im-
port side. A CES function characterises the choice between imported and domestically
produced varieties of the same good. The Armington good enters intermediate and fi-
nal demand. Foreign closure of the model is warranted through the balance-of-payments
constraint.
5 Policy Simulations:
Does the approach to discrete choice matter?
In this section, we apply the model to simulate social welfare reforms that are designed to
stimulate labour market participation of low-income workers. Germany’s social assistance
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system in its present state is particularly suited for our demonstration purposes since it
produces strong labour market disincentives as discussed above. The benefit level is widely
considered too generous from an incentive point of view, and transfer withdrawal results
in effective marginal tax rates that are close to 100 percent at the bottom of the income
distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between gross and net monthly labour
earnings as well as disposable income for a single person without children. The grey line
depicts net earnings, whereas the black line (labelled ‘status quo’) represents disposable
income in the benchmark. Disposable income starts at 600 €, which is the social assistance
level for this household type. Benefits are phased out at a rate of approximately 80 per
cent up to the break even income, where eligibility ends.4
Figure 1: Income function of a single without children
The two policy scenarios explored in our analysis are chosen in order to illuminate the
similarities and differences in the two modelling approaches. It is not our primary aim to
compare the labour market effects in the two scenarios per se. A study directed at the
4"15" and "30 hours" in Figure 1 refer to a weekly labour supply of a worker with a gross
hourly wage of 10.8 €.
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comparison of different policy reform proposals is Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel (2003).
The following section describes the scenarios in more detail. The simulation outcomes are
then presented in two stages: first, partial equilibrium results to highlight the different
working mechanisms of the two labour supply modules, and second, general equilibrium
results that include the interaction with the wage bargaining institutions.
5.1 Reform Scenarios
Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we reduce the basic social assistance rate by 50 per cent for those
welfare recipients who are able to work. For a single person without children, for example,
this means a 25 per cent cut in the benefit level (from roughly 600€ to 450€). FromFigure
1, where the new budget constraint is represented by the bold black line, it can be seen that
this scenario leaves the difference in disposable incomes between non-participation and the
first working time category (15 hours) virtually unchanged. This means that incentives to
take up a part-time job do not increase, whereas higher working time categories become
considerably more attractive relative to non-participation. In such a setting, the logit
approach may be expected to produce substantially larger participation effects than the
AWTP approach since it allows individuals to switch from non-participation to all possible
working-time options. In the AWTP approach, in contrast, individuals are restricted to
switch to adjacent working-time categories.
Scenario 2
In the second scenario, the cut in social assistance payments is more radical, but com-
bined with a reduction in the transfer withdrawal rate. We fully abolish the basic social
assistance rate, which means a 50 per cent lower benefit level (300 €) for a single person
without children. This is combined with cutting the transfer withdrawal rate to zero up
to the net earnings level that is necessary to reach status-quo social assistance.5 E.g., a
single person without children may now earn 300 € net labour income that is not with-
drawn. Net earnings in excess of this amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate
5The transfer withdrawal rate for non-employable single individuals remains the same as in the status-
quo system, whereas employable partners of non-employable persons in couple households face a lower
transfer withdrawal rate.
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of 50 per cent up to the break even income where net income corresponds exactly to
disposable income. For a single person without children, eligibility for social assistance
therefore extends up to net earnings of 900 € (see the dashed line in Figure 1). In contrast
to Scenario 1, Scenario 2 substantially widens the gap in disposable income between non-
participation and the first working time category. Hence, taking up a part-time job now
becomes considerably more attractive. This change in incentives is captured in both mod-
elling approaches (AWTP and logit), so that we can expect the differences in simulated
changes in the participation rates to be smaller in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1.
5.2 Partial equilibrium results
We first present partial equilibrium results, where gross wages are held fixed and the
public budget is not balanced through adjustment of some tax. These results allow us
to focus on the changes in the relative attractiveness of the labour supply options that
solely result from the policy measures. The comparison of the alternative labour supply
modules is thus simplified.
Scenario 1
In Table 1, we exemplify the labour supply responses in Scenario 1 for one particular
household type (low-skilled female singles without children) under the two different sets
of model assumptions (AWTP and logit).
Hours category Benchmark Scenario 1 Scenario 1
share (per cent) AWTP Logit
0 24.6 24.0 20.7
15 22.7 20.5 16.9
30 5.9 8.7 11.8
38 29.9 29.9 33.3
47 16.9 16.9 17.3
Table 1: Hours distribution (single women without children)
Scenario 1 lowers the disposable incomes for hours categories ‘0’ and ‘15’, but leaves
the difference between them nearly unchanged. 30 (and more) hours, however, become
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relatively more attractive (see Figure 1). For the ‘AWTP reactions’ only changes in the
relative attractiveness of adjacent working time categories are relevant. As a consequence,
the main result here is a shift from 15 hours of labour supply to 30 hours. Because the rel-
ative attractiveness of full-time jobs compared to 30 hours is left unchanged, full-time and
overtime work are completely unaffected. Virtually the same is the case for the participa-
tion rate, which goes up only slightly by 0.6 percentage points. By contrast, the equilibrium
distribution produced by the logit approach (last column of Table 1) diverges consider-
ably more from the benchmark distribution. Particularly the participation reaction (3.9
percentage points) is stronger than under the AWTP assumptions. The reason is that
individuals now may change to all hours categories that become more attractive relative
to non-participation, not only the adjacent ones. As a result, the logit simulations produce
an increase in the frequencies of all categories over 15 hours, while non-participation and
15 hours work is reduced.
Individual AWTP Logit
group PR AWT TLS PR AWT TLS
Married men 0.73 -0.07 0.71 2.44 -0.37 2.23
Married women 0.42 -0.34 0.22 1.47 -1.14 0.80
Singles 0.60 -0.23 0.44 1.02 0.59 1.65
Low-skilled 0.59 -0.01 0.71 1.90 -0.42 2.40
High-skilled 0.58 -0.08 0.48 1.66 -0.36 1.60
All 0.58 -0.19 0.51 1.69 -0.30 1.70
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), AWT: average
working time (change in per cent), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent)
Table 2: Partial labour supply effects Scenario 1)
While Table 1 was confined to one particular household type, Table 2 presents the
effects on participation rates, average working time and supplied hours of work for differ-
ent sub-groups of individuals. The effects for these sub-groups depend on the magnitude
of the household-specific labour supply elasticities and the overall distribution of house-
hold types. The aggregate participation reactions under both approaches show a similar
pattern to that in Table 1. For all subaggregates, increases in participation rates are less
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pronounced under the AWTP approach; logit produces effects that are almost three times
as large. A further notable difference is in the average working time effects of those indi-
viduals supplying positive hours of work (AWT). Under the AWTP approach, an increase
in the participation rate comes along with a reduction in average working time because
switches are only into the lowest working time category. Under the logit approach, this is
not necessarily the case since individuals may switch to all possible working hours cate-
gories. The average working time of singles, for example, increases by 0.59 per cent. Under
both approaches, the effect on total labour supply (TLS) is positive because the decrease
in working time is dominated by the increase in participation rates.
Scenario 2
Table 3 reports the partial equilibrium labour supply responses for Scenario 2, again for
low-skilled female singles without children. From Figure 1 it can be seen that in this
scenario taking up a part-time job in the lowest hours category becomes considerably
more attractive since the income gap between non-participation and a 15-hours job is
substantially enlarged.
Hours category Benchmark Scenario 2 Scenario 2
share (per cent) AWTP Logit
0 24.6 17.1 15.4
15 22.7 29.6 23.8
30 5.9 6.6 10.8
38 29.9 29.9 32.8
47 16.9 16.9 17.2
Table 3: Hours distribution single women without children)
The incentive to switch from non-participation to a 15-hours job is similarly well
captured by both approaches, AWTP and logit. As a result, the simulated participation
responses are now considerably closer together than in Scenario 1 (logit: + 9.2 %-p.,
AWTP: + 7.5 %-p.). But again, while in the AWTP case additional participation is
concentrated on the 15-hours category, the logit simulations produce an increase in the
frequencies of all positive hours-of-work categories.
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Individual AWTP Logit
group PR AWT TLS PR AWT TLS
Married men 1.19 -0.17 1.10 1.42 -0.38 1.13
Married women 0.92 -0.92 0.39 1.55 -1.35 0.85
Singles 2.36 -1.62 0.97 2.03 -0.64 1.47
Low-skilled 2.02 -0.24 1.35 2.85 -0.58 2.37
High-skilled 1.32 -0.16 0.82 1.43 -0.34 0.99
All 1.42 -0.81 0.88 1.64 -0.73 1.16
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), AWT: average
working time (change in per cent), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent)
Table 4: Partial labour supply effects (Scenario 2)
Table 4 reports participation, working time and labour supply effects for different
subaggregates. The results of Table 3 can be generalised: For most groups, participation
effects are lower under the AWTP assumptions, but the difference between the two labour
supply modules is considerably smaller than in Scenario 1. The aggregate increase in
participation in the logit case exceeds the response under AWTP by only 15 per cent (+
1.64 %-p. as compared to + 1.42 %-p.).
The participation responses in couple households deserve a closer look. Under the
AWTP assumptions, participation reactions of married men are more pronounced than
those of married women. This is counterintuitive since couple women generally have larger
labour supply elasticities and exhibit considerably higher non-participation rates. The fact
that married men nevertheless react stronger when using the AWTP approach results from
the difference in working time categories open to men and women in connection with the
AWTP-specific patterns of switches between options. For men in couples, entering the
labour force always takes the form of moving into a full-time job. Married women, in
contrast, are restricted to switch to 9.5 hours of work. For men, the participation decision
is thus connected to a larger income difference, and this leads to the more pronounced
participation effect in the AWTP module. The restrictions imposed by different working
hour categories for married men and women are also present in the logit approach, but
there they do not matter that much. Here, married women are found to react stronger than
their male counterparts, as one would expect, since all positive hours-of-work categories
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are available to them6.
The difference between the approaches in the change of total labour supply is larger
than the difference in participation responses. This is because the logit simulations produce
a smaller decrease in average working time than the AWTP approach, where average
working time decreases for all subgroups of individuals.
5.3 General equilibrium results
We now turn to the general equilibrium effects which take into account the equilibrium
wage responses, the labour demand reactions and the adjustment in the marginal income
tax chosen to warrant revenue neutrality of the reforms.
Scenario 1
Table 5 reports the general equilibrium effects on participation rates and total labour
supply as well as changes in equilibrium wages, unemployment rates and effective marginal
tax rates for Scenario 1.
Individual AWTP Logit
group PR TLS W UR TM PR TLS W UR TM
Married men 0.71 0.70 1.73 1.50
Married women 0.40 0.21 1.19 0.56
Singles 0.59 0.44 0.90 1.38
Low-skilled 0.57 0.70 -0.52 0.09 -2.40 1.63 2.13 -0.93 1.58 -2.27
High-skilled 0.57 0.47 -0.72 0.03 -0.46 1.24 1.10 -2.13 0.66 -0.40
All 0.57 0.50 1.30 1.23
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent), W: gross wage (change in per cent), UR: unemployment rate (change
in percentage points), TM: marginal tax rate (change in percentage points)
Table 5: General equilibrium effects (Scenario 1)
6Note that this is not the case in Scenario 1. Even though the gap between male and female partici-
pation responses is narrowed under the Logit approach, men still react more pronounced (see Table 2).
The reason is that for couple men all available working time categories become more attractive relative
to non-participation, whereas for women the relative attractiveness of the lowest category (9.5 hours) is
left unchanged.
21
Compared to the partial equilibrium effects (Table 2), general equilibrium labour sup-
ply responses are mitigated due to the negative impact the reform has on wages. Under
both approaches, the reform leads to a stronger downward pressure on high-skilled as
compared to low-skilled wages. This can be traced back to differences in the change in
the effective marginal tax rates, which — by the tax progression argument (Koskela and
Vilmunen, 1996) — bears on the bargaining behaviour of the unions. The average effec-
tive marginal tax rate decreases more for low-skilled workers because for some low-skilled
part-time jobs the reform entails a complete cut in supplemental social assistance benefits
(see Figure 1). These jobs, which were subject to high marginal transfer withdrawal rates
before, thus face a considerable reduction in effective marginal tax rates. This shifts the
incentive for unions towards higher wages and away from higher employment for low-
skilled workers. In addition, the reform leads to higher unemployment rates (‘UR’) for
both skill types, with the increase being more pronounced for low-skilled labour. Under
both modelling approaches the wage responses are thus not sufficiently strong to absorb
the additional labour supply.
Comparing the relevance of the general equilibrium effects for the two modelling ap-
proaches, we find that general equilibrium repercussions are generally boosted under the
logit approach, which corresponds to the overall larger effects on labour supply. Higher
labour supply translates into lower equilibrium wages and consequently higher negative
feed-back effects on labour supply than in the AWTP case. Moreover, as the logit ap-
proach generates larger labour supply effects, it produces less favourable outcomes with
respect to unemployment. In the AWTP simulations, the increase in unemployment is
only slight, while in the logit simulations it is substantial.
Scenario 2
Finally, Table 6 reports the general equilibrium outcomes for Scenario 2. Like in Sce-
nario 1, the labour supply responses are mitigated due to the downward adjustment of
wages. Unlike Scenario 1, however, Scenario 2 leads to a larger reduction of low-skilled as
compared to high-skilled wages. This has two reasons: First, as can be seen from Table 6,
in Scenario 2 the increase in participation rates of low-skilled workers is higher than for
the high-skilled. Second, the increases in effective marginal tax rates are higher for low-
22
skilled workers7, which, according to the tax progression argument, leads to stronger wage
moderation for this group. In line with the lower gap in the (partial equilibrium) partici-
pation responses, the difference in wages reactions under both approaches is smaller than
in Scenario 1. For example, in Scenario 1 the decrease in high-skilled wages that resulted
in the logit simulations was three times larger than the wage decrease in the AWTP ap-
proach. In Scenario 2, the logit simulations produce a decrease in high-skilled wages that
is only about 75 per cent larger. However, despite the narrower gap in general equilibrium
repercussions, both approaches lead to qualitatively different conclusions with respect to
unemployment.
Individual AWTP Logit
group PR TLS W UR TM PR TLS W UR TM
Married men 1.13 1.03 0.50 0.19
Married women 0.86 0.35 1.45 0.86
Singles 2.35 0.95 1.95 1.12
Low-skilled 1.96 1.28 -2.59 -0.89 2.13 2.52 1.89 -3.82 0.19 2.36
High-skilled 1.27 0.77 -1.54 -0.09 0.75 1.03 0.46 -2.68 0.11 1.00
All 1.37 0.83 1.25 0.64
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent), W: gross wage (change in per cent), UR: unemployment rate (change
in percentage points), TM: marginal tax rate (change in percentage points)
Table 6: General equilibrium effects (Scenario 2)
While the AWTP approach leads to a decrease in unemployment rates for both skill-
types (with the cut being more pronounced for low-skilled labour), the logit simulations
produce the reverse result. Under the AWTP assumptions, the wage reactions are thus
sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher un-
employment, whereas the additional labour supply in the logit setting is too large to be
7At first glance, the increase in effective marginal tax rates is counterintuitive because Scenario 2
explicitly reduces transfer withdrawal rates and, thus, effective marginal tax rates at the bottom of the
income distribution. At the same time, however, social assistance eligibility extends to higher income
levels. As a result, effective marginal tax rates may increase for incomes falling between the benchmark
and the reform break even income. Whether skill-specific effective marginal tax rates increase or decrease
depends on the underlying hours-of-work and household distribution.
23
absorbed by labour demand. These results illustrate that the underlying assumptions con-
cerning the flexibility of labour supply may not only lead to different results with respect
to the labour supply itself, but may also bring about qualitatively diverging shifts of the
entire labour market equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
We have presented two alternative approaches to discrete working time choice that are
suited for an integration into an applied general equilibrium framework. They differ in
the way heterogeneity of households (within an socioeconomic type) is captured and in
the degree of flexibility between options that they accommodate. In the AWTP variant
heterogeneity is produced by an autonomous working time preference parameter, which
results in a setting where working time changes are predominantly between adjacent
options. In the logit framework, in contrast, household heterogeneity results from an
idiosyncratic stochastic utility component, and individuals switch to other options in
proportion to their benchmark frequencies.
Within a partial-equilibrium labour supply setup, more advanced econometric tools
of discrete choice analysis would be available (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). For the use
within a general equilibrium framework, however, the options we analyse are the only
ones that are numerically tractable at present. In the framework of our model, both
approaches share the following advantages of the combination of general equilibrium and
micro analysis:
• The extensive and the intensive margin of labour can be distinguished. This is not
possible in other models in the AGE tradition, even as elaborated as in Hutton and
Ruocco (1999). We can thus break down changes in total labour supply into changes
in the participation rate and changes in the average hours of work supplied, as e.g.
in Table 2 in Section 5.
• For each individual household a complex budget constraint is formulated, so that
the details of national tax and transfer systems can be integrated in the model.
This is especially important for couple households, for which tax and transfer rules
depend on the household composition as well as the labour market status of both
spouses.
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• Complex interactions are captured for the economy as a whole. Labour supply chan-
ges affect different sectors of the economy differently, with sectoral factor demand
and international trade consequences. The public budget is affected both directly
through reform policies and indirectly through their consequences throughout the
whole economy.
Despite these similarities of the two approaches, the scenario outcomes from their compar-
ative application in Section 5 are divergent in some important respects. This can mainly
be traced back to the fundamental dissimilarity in treating switches between options: In
AWTP, individuals are constrained to switch beween adjacent options, whereas in the
logit setup, switches between all options are possible.
• In general, the labour supply reactions in the logit setup are stronger than in the
AWTP model, although the partial elasticities used to calibrate the AWTP model
have been derived from the logit parameters.
• The differences in the simulated changes in the participation rates are moderate
as long as the relevant changes in relative disposable incomes are between non-
participation and the lowest positive working time category (as in Scenario 2). Oth-
erwise (Scenario 1), the discepancy between the model outcomes can be considerable.
• Concerning the differences in the simulated average hours of work, under the AWTP
approach, an increase in the participation rate comes along with a reduction in av-
erage working time because switches are only into the lowest working time category.
Under the logit approach this is not necessarily the case since individuals may switch
to all possible working hours categories.
Both modelling variants are plausible formulations of household heterogeneity, and their
value for applied work cannot be judged a priori. The decisive question is whether our
empirical knowledge of actual reaction patterns in labour supply is so detailed that we
can use it for discrimination. As the two approaches are not nested, it is difficult to
directly test them against one another. In principle, such a test could proceed along the
lines of a test of the IIA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) implication of simple
conditional logit, but even in the relatively simple case of IIA it is difficult to draw clear
conclusions from the results (Train, 2003, p.53). Given the sparse econometric evidence
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on reaction patterns in the literature, we must rely on indirect arguments that are more
favourable for the logit than for the AWTP approach:
• The restrictions on labour supply behaviour that results from the functional form
in the AWTP approach seem considerably more severe. It is clearly counterfactual
that households only change between adjacent labour supply options.
• Given that the calibration data for the model are produced with logit simulations
(according to the standard econometric approach), there are some compatibility
problems that weaken the empirical foundation of the AWTP model. To a certain
degree it is arbitrary which elasticities one chooses for calibration; and it is bur-
densome to check whether other elasticities would make a difference. When we use
partial elasticities for calibration, the AWTP parameterisation is such that simu-
lated elasticities can only be approximated to a certain degree (see the comparison
of simulated and calibrated elasticity values in Appendix A.4).
• The AWTP approach requires that we disassemble the simultaneous maximisation
problem of the household into two independent working time choices of the partners.
This is done by assuming that when one partner chooses their optimal working time,
they take the other partner’s income and leisure to be constant at their conditional
expected values given the benchmark probabilities. Otherwise multiple equilibria
might arise for which an explicit choice mechanism would have to be set up.
Against this background of difficulties with the AWTP approach, the logit alternative is
preferable. The main advantage results from its direct compatibility with the underly-
ing estimation and simulation of labour supply reactions in a standard microsimulation
model. The problems of the logit setup — mainly the IIA implication — is less severe and
can be approached using established econometric techniques. All in all, we see the logit
approach as the more promising option in a general equilibrium framework combining
comprehensiveness, detail and consistency in applied research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Household classification for labour supply module
Abbreviation Definition
CijxK couple, woman skill group i, man skill group j, x children
Mi0 male single, skill group i, no children
Wi0 female single, skill group i, no children
xKi single (male or female), skill group i, x children
i = L (low skilled), H (high skilled), x = 0, 1, 2 or more
Table 7: Household Disaggregation
A.2 Working hours options for different household types
Individual Hours Options
men, married or single without children 0 38 49
men, single with children 0 15 30 38 47
women, single 0 15 30 38 47
women, married 0 9.5 24 38 47
Table 8: Discrete Working Hours by Household Types
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A.3 Estimation results from the microsimulation model
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income -6.44 1.85 -3.48 0.001
Net household income^2 0.43 0.08 5.22 0.000
Net hh income X leisure 0.48 0.30 1.63 0.103
Leisure X East Germany -0.96 0.29 -3.32 0.001
Leisure X nationality 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.566
Leisure 77.59 14.10 5.50 0.000
Leisure^2 -9.96 1.80 -5.55 0.000
Leisure X age -1.11 0.31 -3.65 0.000
Leisure X age^2 0.10 0.04 2.42 0.016
Leisure^2 X age 0.59 0.12 4.83 0.000
Leisure X handicapped -0.17 0.90 -0.18 0.853
Leisure X children <6 years 4.99 0.60 8.32 0.000
Leisure X children 7-16 years 1.50 0.35 4.29 0.000
Leisure X children >=17 years -0.48 0.31 -1.53 0.127
Dummy for employment -2.13 0.25 -8.67 0.000
Number of obs. 540
Log Likelihood -636.0
Conditional Logit with five hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for single females
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Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 6.76 2.73 2.48 0.013
Net household income^2 -0.019 0.10 -0.19 0.848
Net hh income X leisure -1.42 0.44 -3.21 0.001
Leisure 169.71 20.03 8.47 0.000
Leisure ^2 -21.13 2.60 -8.12 0.000
Leisure X East Germany -0.05 0.33 -0.15 0.881
Leisure X nationality 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.547
Leisure X age -0.74 0.32 -2.34 0.019
Leisure X age^2 0.41 0.12 3.35 0.001
Leisure^2 X age 0.06 0.04 1.46 0.143
Leisure X handicapped 1.32 0.83 1.60 0.110
Dummy for employment -9.96 1.13 -8.78 0.000
Number of obs. 952
Log Likelihood -1286.7
conditional Logit with five hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for single males
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Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 8.95 5.11 1.75 0.080
Net household income^2 -0.003 0.26 -0.01 0.989
Net hh income X leisure of male spouse -1.46 0.42 -3.46 0.001
Net hh income X leisure of female spouse -0.43 0.38 -1.14 0.253
Net hh income X nationality -6.92 3.82 -1.81 0.070
Net hh income^2 X nationality 0.56 0.27 2.09 0.036
Net hh income X East Germany 5.50 1.87 2.94 0.003
Net hh income^2 X East Germany -0.49 0.14 -3.37 0.001
Leisure of male spouse 56.72 7.15 7.94 0.000
Leisure of male spouse^2 -4.06 0.47 -8.66 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X nationality -0.40 0.41 -0.98 0.328
Leisure of male spouse X East Germany -6.05 2.80 -2.16 0.031
Leisure of male spouse X age -0.36 0.08 -4.31 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X age ^2 0.48 0.10 4.99 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X handicapped 0.76 0.72 1.06 0.290
Leisure of female spouse 79.98 7.00 11.43 0.000
Leisure of female spouse^2 -8.40 0.53 -15.77 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.27 0.40 0.67 0.501
Leisure of female spouse X East Germany -7.10 2.59 -2.74 0.006
Leisure of female spouse X age -0.39 0.09 -4.18 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X age^2 0.58 0.11 5.26 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X handicapped 0.97 0.71 1.36 0.175
Leisure of female spouse X children <6 years 4.63 0.31 14.98 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children 7-16 years 2.13 0.22 9.59 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children >=17 years -0.56 0.22 -2.56 0.011
Leisure of male spouse X Leisure of female spouse -1.50 0.55 -2.72 0.006
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.26 0.14 1.78 0.075
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X East Germany 1.03 0.70 1.47 0.142
Dummy for employment of female spouse -2.55 0.25 -10.09 0.000
Dummy for employment of both spouses 0.61 0.24 2.54 0.011
Number of obs. 1910
Log Likelihood -4186.1
Conditional logit with fifteen hours-of-work options (female spouse: 0, 9.5, 47;
male spouse: 0, 38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 11: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for couples
33
A.4 Comparison of simulated and calibrated elasticities
Elasticities Men Elasticities Women
Household 1 (s) 1 (c) 2 (s) 2 (c) 1 (s) 1 (c) 2 (s) 2 (c) 3 (s) 3 (c) 4 (s) 4 (c)
CLL0K 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.09
CLH0K 0.50 0.64 0.62 0.41 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.13
CHL0K 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.16 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.19
CHH0K 0.48 0.62 0.63 0.43 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.13
CLL1K 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.05
CLH1K 0.47 0.60 0.59 0.39 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.04
CHL1K 0.36 0.47 0.49 0.36 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.06
CHH1K 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.39 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.06
CLL2K 0.31 0.39 0.37 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.01
CLH2K 0.52 0.69 0.70 0.42 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.01
CHL2K 0.43 0.57 0.62 0.42 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.04
CHH2K 0.49 0.63 0.65 0.46 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.04
CLL3K 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.00
CLH3K 0.49 0.62 0.61 0.42 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.00
CHL3K 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.00
CHH3K 0.44 0.57 0.58 0.38 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.01
ML0 — — — — 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.12
MH0 — — — — 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.13
WL0 — — — — 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.14
WH0 — — — — 0.05 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.39 0.29 0.19
1KL — — — — 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.07
1KH — — — — 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.11
2KL — — — — 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.00
2KH — — — — 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
3KL — — — — 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.18 0.00
3KH — — — — 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.04
1, 2, 3, 4: positive time categories, (s): simulated elasticities, (c): calibrated elasticities
elasticity values are to be read like this: change of labour supply probability in one category in
percentage points as a reaction to a one per cent change of the wage in the respective category
Table 12: Partial labour supply elasticities
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A.5 Aggregated coefficients of logit utility function
Household β(C) β(lf ) β(lm) A(C2) A(Clf ) A(Clm) A(l2f ) A(lf lm) A(l2m) df dfm
CLL0K 5.25 76.4 51.4 0.29 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.37 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLH0K 2.76 74.9 50.1 0.49 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.19 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHL0K 2.80 74.5 49.9 0.49 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.16 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHH0K 3.08 74.2 49.4 0.46 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.08 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLL1K 7.28 75.8 51.0 0.13 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.44 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLH1K 3.38 75.8 50.0 0.44 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.24 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHL1K 4.07 74.3 48.8 0.38 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.05 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHH1K 3.72 74.2 48.3 0.41 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -0.94 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLL2K 6.28 76.1 50.5 0.21 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.40 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLH2K 3.05 76.2 49.7 0.47 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.25 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHL2K 2.71 76.1 49.3 0.50 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.21 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHH2K 3.42 75.0 48.5 0.43 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.03 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLL3K 7.63 76.5 50.3 0.10 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.45 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CLH3K 2.95 78.1 50.0 0.48 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.28 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHL3K 4.12 76.4 48.9 0.38 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.17 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
CHH3K 3.09 76.8 48.7 0.46 -0.43 -1.46 -8.40 -1.08 -4.06 -2.55 0.61
ML0 6.76 148.2 — -0.02 -1.42 — — -18.92 — -9.96 —
MH0 6.76 147.2 — -0.02 -1.42 — — -18.78 — -9.96 —
WL0 -6.44 38.0 — 0.43 0.48 — — -5.22 — -2.13 —
WH0 -6.44 42.8 — 0.43 0.48 — — -6.03 — -2.13 —
1KL -5.96 46.9 — 0.41 0.41 — — -6.23 — -2.42 —
1KH -4.09 60.8 — 0.35 0.14 — — -8.19 — -3.52 —
2KL -3.80 62.9 — 0.34 0.10 — — -8.42 — -3.70 —
2KH -4.01 61.2 — 0.35 0.13 — — -8.13 — -3.57 —
3KL -6.36 49.0 — 0.43 0.47 — — -6.33 — -2.18 —
3KH -5.64 51.5 — 0.40 0.37 — — -6.99 — -2.61 —
Table 13: Aggregated parameters of the utility function
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A.6 The formulation of the individual household’s budget con-
straint
Gross monthly earnings are obtained by multiplying the gross hourly wage with monthly
hours of work corresponding to the respective category of weekly labour supply. As we
distinguish low and high-skilled labour, gross individual income does not only depend
on the chosen category of hours worked, but also on individual qualification. Low-skilled
workers are defined as persons without any formal vocational training, whereas individuals
holding a vocational or university degree are assumed to be high-skilled. Gross hourly
wages are assumed uniform at 10.8 € for low skilled and 14.3 € for high skilled. These
are average wages for the respective qualification levels in the German SOEP for the year
2000.
To obtain net earnings per month, income taxes and social security contributions are
deducted from gross monthly earnings. The share in social security contributions borne
by employees is taken to amount to 20 per cent of gross monthly earnings. In 2000, gross
monthly earnings of 325 € were exempted from social security contributions. Income taxes
are calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is obtained by subtracting a standard
deduction from gross earnings. To determine income taxes paid by each household type,
we apply the German income tax schedule from the benchmark year 2000 to taxable
earnings. For couple households, income tax legislation allows for marital income splitting:
According to this method, the tax schedule is applied to half of the joint taxable income,
while the resulting tax amount is doubled to obtain total income taxes paid by the couple.
Finally, disposable monthly earnings are obtained by adding transfer payments to net
monthly labour earnings The most important transfer payments in Germany include
unemployment insurance ("Arbeitslosengeld"), unemployment assistance ("Arbeitslosen-
hilfe"), social assistance ("Sozialhilfe"), housing benefits ("Wohngeld") and child benefits
("Kindergeld"). In our model, we account for unemployment benefits and assistance, social
assistance and child benefits, while housing benefits are neglected.
In Germany, unemployment benefits (UB) are available for persons who have paid
contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance for a minimum of one year. In
particular, the duration of unemployment benefits depends on the unemployed person’s
former labour market experience and age. The monthly amount received equals a constant
fraction of previous net monthly earnings. At present, the replacement rate for persons
without children is 60 per cent and for persons with children 67 per cent. Unemploy-
ment benefits are not means-tested. The entitlement to unemployment benefits is thus
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completely independent from the labour or transfer income received by the respective
spouse.
For those persons who do not have enough experience to obtain unemployment benefits
or who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance (UA) and
social assistance (SA) become relevant. The replacement rate for UA payments for persons
without children is 53 per cent and for persons with children 57 per cent. In contrast to un-
employment benefits, both welfare payments are means-tested, i.e. payments are reduced
if either the unemployed person or remaining household members receive other incomes.
While UA is only available for those persons who have exhausted their unemployment
benefits, eligibility for SA does not require any former entitlement to unemployment ben-
efits. Our model takes into account the means-tested nature of SA payments, but neglects
the means-tested nature of UA payments. To incorporate the different transfer compo-
nents in our model, we proceed as follows: first, we assign SA payments to all voluntarily
unemployed singles and to those couple households whose adult members are both volun-
tarily unemployed. Second, for positive hours of labour supply we distinguish three labour
market states: a person who supplies a positive number of hours worked may be employed,
which will be denoted as state (e). If the individual does not find a job and becomes in-
voluntarily unemployed, he or she may either be entitled to UB or UA (b) or receive SA
payments (n). In a static model, we are not able to determine the entitlement to UB or
UA due to former contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance. Instead, we
assume that a person who becomes unemployed is entitled to unemployment benefits or
unemployment assistance with an exogenous probability PU , and receives SA payments
with probability (1−PU). In the former case, UB and UA payments are determined by the
replacement ratio of the net income that corresponds to the chosen category of hours of
labour supplied. More specifically, this replacement ratio is defined as a weighted average
of UB and UA replacement rates where the weights are the respective empirical shares of
persons entitled to UA or UB. SA payments, in contrast, do not depend on the category
of hours supplied in the labour market.
The distinction of three labour market states requires that the value of disposable
income for a particular category of working time be calculated as an expected value. For
singles, the expected value of the disposable income for a particular category of hours of
work supplied is determined as a weighted average of the disposable income values in the
three labour market states (e, b and n), with the respective probabilities, P (i), i = e, b, n,
as weights:
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E(y(hk)) =
X
i=e,b,n
P (i) yD(hk, i), i = e, b, n (5)
More specifically, we have P (w) = (1 − u), P (b) = uPU and P (n) = u(1 − PU), with u
representing the (household type specific) unemployment rate. For couples, the expected
disposable income for a particular combination of hours of work is determined by the
weighted average of disposable incomes corresponding to the 9 combinations of labour
market states:
E(yd(hfk , h
m
l )) =
X
i,j=e,b,n
P (i)P (j)yD(hfk , h
m
l , i, j), i, j = e, b, n (6)
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